Insights

The IMO Net-Zero Framework: A One-Year Adjournment and the Critical Path to 2033

Abstract

In October 2025, the International Maritime Organization’s Marine Environment Protection Committee convened for an extraordinary session that was expected to formally adopt the IMO Net-Zero Framework—a landmark regulatory package combining a global fuel standard with the world’s first sectoral carbon pricing mechanism. Instead, the session concluded with a decision to adjourn adoption for one year, following a vote of 57 in favour of delay, 49 against, and 21 abstentions. This article examines the political dynamics that led to this postponement, analyses the framework’s accepted and contested elements, and evaluates the implications for maritime decarbonisation in the context of the critical 2030–2033 transition period. The analysis suggests that while the delay represents a significant setback for global climate governance, it also reveals the complex interplay between environmental imperatives, economic considerations, and geopolitical pressures that will shape the future of international shipping regulation.

I. Background and the One-Year Postponement at IMO

The Road to MEPC Extraordinary Session

The International Maritime Organization (IMO), as the specialised United Nations agency responsible for the safety and security of shipping and the prevention of marine and atmospheric pollution by ships, has been engaged in an increasingly urgent effort to address the maritime sector’s contribution to global greenhouse gas emissions. International shipping accounts for approximately 3% of global GHG emissions—a figure that, while seemingly modest, represents a volume larger than the annual emissions of most individual nations.

The foundational instrument for this effort is the 2023 IMO Strategy on Reduction of GHG Emissions from Ships, adopted at the 80th session of the Marine Environment Protection Committee (MEPC 80) in July 2023. This revised strategy represented a significant strengthening of the Initial GHG Strategy from 2018, establishing net-zero emissions “by or around, i.e. close to, 2050” as the sector’s ultimate objective, with indicative checkpoints requiring emissions reductions of at least 20% (striving for 30%) by 2030 and at least 70% (striving for 80%) by 2040, compared to 2008 levels.

To operationalise this strategy, the IMO developed what became known as the Net-Zero Framework (NZF)—a comprehensive regulatory package that would constitute a new Chapter 5 of MARPOL Annex VI. At MEPC 83 in April 2025, Member States approved the draft legal text of this framework, which combines two principal instruments: a Global Fuel Standard establishing progressively stringent GHG fuel intensity (GFI) targets, and a Carbon Pricing Mechanism creating market-based incentives for compliance and revenue generation for transition support.

Key Components of the IMO Net-Zero Framework
  • Global Fuel Standard: Ships must reduce their annual GHG fuel intensity using a “well-to-wake” lifecycle assessment methodology
  • Two-Tier Compliance System: Base Target (BT) and Direct Compliance Target (DCT) with associated penalties and rewards
  • Carbon Pricing: Initial price of USD 100 per tonne CO₂ for Tier 1 remedial units, USD 380 for Tier 2
  • IMO Net-Zero Fund: Revenue mechanism projected to generate USD 10–15 billion annually
  • ZNZ Rewards: Financial incentives for ships using zero or near-zero emission technologies
  • Scope: Applicable to ships over 5,000 gross tonnage (85% of shipping emissions)

The Extraordinary Session: 14–17 October 2025

The Second Extraordinary Session of the MEPC (MEPC/ES.2), convened in London from 14 to 17 October 2025, was intended to be the culminating moment in this regulatory journey—the formal adoption of the NZF that would set the framework on its path to legal binding force through MARPOL’s tacit acceptance procedure. The original timeline envisaged entry into force in March 2027, with GHG reporting becoming mandatory from 2028 and reward payments for compliant vessels beginning in 2029.

However, the extraordinary session opened under a cloud of unprecedented political pressure. In the weeks preceding the meeting, the geopolitical landscape had shifted dramatically. The United States, which had already withdrawn from negotiations at MEPC 83, escalated its opposition through a series of increasingly strident interventions. On 10 October 2025, a joint statement from Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Secretary of Energy Chris Wright, and Secretary of Transportation Sean Duffy “unequivocally rejected” the NZF, characterising it as an “unsanctioned global tax regime” that would unfairly burden international shipping.

“I am outraged that the International Maritime Organization is voting in London this week to pass a global Carbon Tax. The United States will NOT stand for this Global Green New Scam Tax on Shipping, and will not adhere to it in any way, shape, or form.”

— President Donald Trump, Truth Social, October 2025

The United States had previously indicated that it could impose trade, port, and other restrictions on Member States voting in favour of the measures—a threat that fundamentally altered the calculus for many delegations. This external pressure, combined with existing concerns among certain Member States about the framework’s economic implications and implementation challenges, created conditions in which consensus became increasingly elusive.

After four days of what observers described as “increasingly tense and fraught negotiations,” Saudi Arabia proposed a motion to adjourn the session by one year. The motion was put to a vote—itself an unusual procedural step in an organisation that traditionally operates by consensus. The result was decisive in its division: 57 Member States voted in favour of adjournment, 49 voted against, and 21 abstained, with 8 Member States absent from the vote.

ℹ️ Vote Outcome — MEPC/ES.2 (17 October 2025)

The motion to adjourn adoption of the Net-Zero Framework for one year passed with 57 votes in favour, 49 against, and 21 abstentions. Eight Member States were not present for the vote. The framework will be reconsidered at a future session, with the date to be determined at MEPC 84 in April 2026.

II. Accepted Headings: Emerging Consensus on Technical Foundations

Despite the failure to achieve formal adoption, the MEPC 83 session in April 2025 had demonstrated significant areas of convergence among Member States. Understanding these areas of agreement is essential for assessing both the substantive progress achieved and the prospects for eventual adoption.

The Global Fuel Standard Architecture

Perhaps the most significant achievement of the NZF negotiations was the broad acceptance of the principle that maritime decarbonisation requires a global fuel standard based on lifecycle GHG intensity. The “well-to-wake” methodology—encompassing emissions from fuel production, transportation, and combustion—represented a technically sophisticated approach that addresses the risk of emissions displacement to other sectors while providing standardised criteria applicable regardless of where fuel is produced, transported, or consumed.

Member States reached agreement on GFI reduction targets for the period 2028–2035, using a 2008 reference value of 93.3 gCO₂eq/MJ. The framework establishes a trajectory for emissions reductions that extends beyond carbon dioxide to include methane (CH₄) and nitrous oxide (N₂O)—an important refinement given the increasing use of LNG and the potential for methane slip from certain propulsion systems. A 2040 base target representing a 65% reduction from the reference value was also agreed, with further targets beyond 2035 to be determined at MEPC sessions before the end of 2032.

The Two-Tier Compliance System

The framework’s compliance architecture, featuring Base Targets and Direct Compliance Targets, gained acceptance as a flexible mechanism capable of accommodating diverse fleet compositions and operational profiles. Ships exceeding the DCT would generate bankable Surplus Units (SUs), while those failing to meet targets would need to acquire Remedial Units (RUs) through contributions to the IMO Net-Zero Fund or through transfer from compliant vessels.

This approach mirrors, in principle, elements of the EU’s FuelEU Maritime regulation and creates opportunities for fleet pooling and credit trading that can reduce overall compliance costs while maintaining environmental integrity. The acceptance of this architecture reflects recognition that a purely prescriptive approach would be insufficiently responsive to the heterogeneous nature of the global fleet and the varying pace at which different operators can access alternative fuels and technologies.

Life Cycle Assessment Guidelines

The 2024 Guidelines on the Life-Cycle GHG Intensity of Marine Fuels (resolution MEPC.391(81)) provided the methodological foundation for the NZF’s fuel standard. These guidelines, subsequently refined through work by GESAMP’s LCA Working Group, established standardised approaches for calculating well-to-tank and tank-to-wake emissions factors for various fuel pathways. The acceptance of these guidelines reflects years of technical work to develop credible, verifiable methodologies for comparing the climate impact of different marine fuels.

Continued work on sustainability criteria and certification frameworks remains ongoing, but the fundamental approach to lifecycle assessment has achieved broad consensus—a significant technical achievement that will endure regardless of delays in the framework’s formal adoption.

Element Status Key Supporters
Global Fuel Standard (GFI) Approved at MEPC 83 EU, Pacific Islands, Norway, Japan
Well-to-Wake Methodology Adopted (LCA Guidelines) Broad consensus
Two-Tier Compliance System Approved at MEPC 83 Industry groups, EU, UK
5,000 GT Threshold Approved at MEPC 83 Broad consensus
2028–2035 GFI Targets Approved at MEPC 83 Climate-ambitious states
OCCS Regulatory Framework Work plan approved Flag states, industry

III. Contested or Rejected Headings: Lines of Conflict

The adjournment of the extraordinary session exposed fundamental divisions among Member States on several critical aspects of the framework. These contested areas reveal the complex interplay of economic interests, geopolitical alignments, and divergent assessments of implementation feasibility that must be navigated before adoption can succeed.

The Carbon Pricing Mechanism

The most contentious element of the NZF was undoubtedly the carbon pricing mechanism—specifically, the mandatory payments for Remedial Units that would flow into the IMO Net-Zero Fund. For opponents, this represented an unprecedented assertion of supranational taxing authority over a major sector of global commerce. The United States’ characterisation of the mechanism as an “unsanctioned global tax regime” captured this concern, though it elided the distinction between a tax (imposed by governmental authority) and a compliance cost within a multilaterally agreed regulatory framework.

The pricing levels themselves—USD 100 per tonne CO₂ for Tier 1 and USD 380 for Tier 2—were viewed by environmental advocates as potentially insufficient to drive meaningful behavioural change, while fossil fuel-producing states and major shipping nations expressed concern about the economic burden on operators and, ultimately, on consumers of shipped goods. The stipulation that these prices would be subject to review “for the reporting periods starting 2031 onwards” introduced additional uncertainty about the framework’s long-term cost implications.

⚠️ Opposing Positions on Carbon Pricing

Against adoption: United States, Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE, Singapore, Liberia, and China (which reversed its April 2025 position). These states cited concerns including: lack of sufficient clean fuel supply, economic impacts on developing economies, technological readiness, and opposition to global carbon taxation mechanisms.

For adoption: Most EU Member States, United Kingdom, Norway, Small Island Developing States (SIDS), and environmental organisations. These parties emphasised: climate urgency, the need for regulatory certainty to drive investment, and support for vulnerable states through the Net-Zero Fund.

Revenue Distribution and Fund Governance

The design of the IMO Net-Zero Fund proved to be a significant source of contention, particularly regarding the allocation of revenues. Pacific Island nations, acutely vulnerable to climate change impacts and heavily dependent on maritime connectivity, pushed for a fixed share of funds to be allocated directly to Small Island Developing States (SIDS) and Least Developed Countries (LDCs). This demand, while supported by climate justice advocates, failed to gain widespread acceptance from larger economies concerned about creating precedents for hypothecated climate finance.

The framework as approved at MEPC 83 established three broad categories for fund disbursement: rewards for ZNZ technology adoption, support for developing countries (including training, technology transfer, and infrastructure), and administrative costs. However, the precise mechanisms for governing these allocations, including the role of the IMO Secretary-General in fund management, remained insufficiently defined—contributing to scepticism among states that might otherwise have supported adoption.

Acceptance Procedure: Tacit vs. Explicit

An ostensibly procedural matter emerged as a significant substantive concern: the mechanism by which the amended MARPOL Annex VI would enter into force. The traditional tacit acceptance procedure, under which amendments become binding automatically after a specified period unless sufficient objections are registered, was challenged by several delegations who proposed an explicit acceptance procedure requiring affirmative acceptance by two-thirds of contracting governments representing at least half of world gross tonnage.

This proposal, while framed in procedural terms, had profound implications for the framework’s prospects. Explicit acceptance would significantly delay implementation and create opportunities for opponents to mobilise resistance during the acceptance period. The issue was left unresolved and will be revisited at MEPC 84.

Clean Fuel Availability and Technological Readiness

Beyond the explicitly political objections, a substantive critique of the NZF focused on the availability of compliant fuels. Critics argued that the GHG intensity targets, particularly for the period 2028–2030, presuppose access to alternative fuels and technologies that do not yet exist at commercial scale. Recent studies have questioned whether sufficient zero or near-zero emission fuels will be available to meet demand, given constraints in production capacity, infrastructure, and supply chain development.

This critique gained traction among states with significant shipbuilding and shipping industries, including Singapore and China, as well as among flag states like Liberia whose registries serve diverse global operators with varying capacities for fleet renewal. The framework’s credit-purchasing pathway was intended to address this concern, but projected credit availability raised questions about the system’s ability to function as designed during the critical early implementation period.

Position Category Member States Primary Concerns
Active Opposition USA, Saudi Arabia, Russia, UAE Sovereignty, economic burden, carbon “tax” characterisation
Delay Supporters Singapore, Liberia, China Fuel availability, technological readiness, consensus-building
Abstentions Greece, Cyprus Shipping industry concerns, EU alignment tensions
Adoption Supporters EU (most), UK, Norway, SIDS Climate urgency, investment certainty, just transition

IV. Why 2033 Matters: Time, Green Transition, and Maritime Governance

The postponement of the NZF’s adoption must be understood not merely as a procedural delay but as a potential inflection point in the global green transition. The period between now and 2033 represents a critical window during which the fundamental trajectory of maritime decarbonisation—and, by extension, of global trade’s environmental footprint—will be determined.

The 2030–2033 Decision Horizon

The IMO’s 2023 GHG Strategy establishes 2030 as the first major checkpoint, requiring emissions reductions of at least 20% (striving for 30%) from 2008 levels and zero or near-zero emission fuels to represent at least 5% (striving for 10%) of energy use. These targets, already ambitious given the sector’s current trajectory, become increasingly difficult to achieve with each year of regulatory uncertainty.

Moreover, the strategy mandates that targets beyond 2035 be determined “at MEPC sessions before the end of 2032.” This timeline creates a decision horizon extending to approximately 2033 during which the regulatory architecture for the final phase of decarbonisation—the push toward net-zero by 2050—must be established. The one-year delay in NZF adoption compresses this already tight timeline, potentially forcing accelerated decisions on post-2035 targets before the framework’s initial implementation can generate meaningful compliance data.

April 2025
MEPC 83 approves NZF in principle; US withdraws from negotiations
October 2025
MEPC/ES.2 adjourns adoption for one year (57-49-21 vote)
April 2026
MEPC 84: Guidelines work continues; reconsideration date to be set
October 2026
Anticipated reconvened extraordinary session for NZF adoption
2028
Earliest possible entry into force (revised from 2027)
2030
First IMO GHG Strategy checkpoint: 20-30% emissions reduction target
2032–2033
Decision deadline for post-2035 targets; critical policy window closes

Investment Uncertainty and Green Shipping Finance

The maritime industry’s transition to low and zero-emission operations requires capital investments measured in hundreds of billions of dollars—new vessel construction, retrofit programmes, alternative fuel infrastructure, port electrification, and crew training. These investments have long lead times and depend critically on regulatory certainty. Shipowners and financiers making decisions today about vessel orders that will enter service in 2028 or 2029 need clarity about the regulatory environment those vessels will face over their 25–30 year operational lives.

The delay in NZF adoption creates precisely the kind of uncertainty that chills investment. Without a clear global framework, shipowners face the prospect of a fragmented regulatory landscape in which regional requirements—particularly the EU’s FuelEU Maritime regulation and EU Emissions Trading System—coexist with undefined international standards. This fragmentation increases compliance complexity and costs while potentially disadvantaging operators serving global routes.

The investment implications extend beyond the shipping sector itself. The development of alternative marine fuels—green ammonia, green methanol, advanced biofuels—requires massive capital commitments from energy producers, infrastructure developers, and port authorities. These investments are predicated on anticipated demand from a decarbonising shipping sector. Without a credible regulatory framework signalling when and how stringently that demand will materialise, fuel production projects face heightened uncertainty that may delay final investment decisions.

Contractual and Risk Allocation Implications

The postponement has immediate implications for maritime commercial practice. Charter parties, shipbuilding contracts, and fuel supply agreements increasingly incorporate provisions addressing emissions compliance and associated costs. The absence of a finalised IMO framework creates ambiguity about how these provisions should be drafted and interpreted.

Time charter parties, for example, often allocate regulatory compliance costs between owners and charterers. Without clarity on the NZF’s final form, drafters face uncertainty about the magnitude and timing of compliance costs, the availability of remedial units and surplus credits, and the allocation of responsibility for acquiring ZNZ fuels. Similar challenges arise in contracts of affreightment, where emissions intensity may affect both pricing and cargo allocation decisions.

Shipbuilding contracts face particular challenges. Vessels ordered today will likely enter service during the initial implementation period of whatever framework is eventually adopted. The absence of final technical specifications creates risk that vessels may require modification or face compliance challenges shortly after delivery—a risk that must be allocated between yards and buyers in the contracting process.

Port Infrastructure and the Green Corridor Concept

The postponement also affects the development of port infrastructure necessary for maritime decarbonisation. The “green corridor” concept—specific shipping routes where zero-emission shipping is enabled through coordinated public and private investment—has gained significant momentum as a mechanism for demonstrating feasibility and building operational experience. These corridors require substantial port-side investments in bunkering facilities, shore power connections, and fuel storage infrastructure.

Port authorities making these investments rely on projections of future demand for alternative fuels and services. The delay in establishing a global framework introduces uncertainty into these projections, potentially slowing the development of the infrastructure that will be essential for widespread fleet transition. This creates a risk of path dependency: if infrastructure development lags, the argument that clean fuels are unavailable becomes self-fulfilling, strengthening the case for further regulatory delay.

Climate Ambition vs. Economic Concerns: A False Dichotomy?

The debate around the NZF has often been framed as a conflict between climate ambition and economic pragmatism. This framing, while politically convenient, obscures a more complex reality. The economic costs of maritime decarbonisation, while substantial, must be weighed against the economic costs of climate inaction—including, importantly, the costs that will be borne by maritime-dependent economies if climate impacts disrupt global trade patterns, damage port infrastructure, and alter shipping routes.

Small Island Developing States, whose representatives at the MEPC have been among the most vocal advocates for ambitious action, understand this calculus acutely. For these nations, the costs of regulatory delay are not abstract future possibilities but present realities manifesting in sea-level rise, intensified storm patterns, and threats to the maritime connectivity on which their economies depend.

The advisory opinions issued by the International Court of Justice and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea in 2024 have reinforced the legal obligations of states to address climate change, including through sectoral regulatory action. The postponement of the NZF, while not itself a violation of these obligations, must be assessed against a backdrop of evolving international law that increasingly recognises climate action as a legal imperative rather than a discretionary policy choice.

Conclusion: A Delay or a Decisive Test?

In a world racing toward a green transition, the question presents itself with unavoidable force: was the one-year postponement at IMO merely a delay—a pause in an inexorable process that will resume and ultimately succeed—or a decisive test that the international community has failed?

The evidence permits no easy answer. On one hand, the technical work underpinning the NZF continues. The Intersessional Working Group on GHG Emissions proceeded with its scheduled meeting in the week following the extraordinary session, advancing guidelines on lifecycle assessment, ZNZ definitions, and fund governance. Member States have not abandoned the framework but rather deferred its adoption while continuing to develop its implementation architecture. The fundamental direction of travel—toward binding emissions limits and carbon pricing for international shipping—remains unchanged.

On the other hand, the circumstances of the postponement are troubling. The intervention of a major power threatening economic retaliation against states exercising their sovereign judgment in an international forum represents a concerning precedent for multilateral climate governance. The shift in position by several states between April and October 2025 suggests that geopolitical pressure can fracture carefully built consensus, potentially emboldening similar tactics in future negotiations.

What is clear is that 2033 represents more than an arbitrary milestone. It marks the point at which decisions about the final phase of maritime decarbonisation must be made on the basis of whatever regulatory framework exists. If that framework remains contested, incomplete, or inadequately implemented, the shipping sector’s ability to contribute to Paris Agreement objectives will be fundamentally compromised—with consequences extending far beyond the maritime industry to global trade, supply chains, and the economies that depend upon them.

The one-year delay is, in this sense, both a pause and a test: a test of whether the international community can rebuild consensus under conditions of geopolitical fragmentation, and whether the urgency of climate action can prevail over short-term economic and political calculations. The outcome of that test remains to be written.

This article is provided for informational purposes and does not constitute legal advice. The analysis reflects publicly available information as of December 2025 and developments in IMO proceedings may alter the assessments presented herein. For guidance on specific contractual, regulatory, or commercial matters relating to maritime decarbonisation, please contact MarinLex Consultancy.

IMO MEPC Net-Zero Framework Maritime Decarbonisation MARPOL Annex VI Carbon Pricing Green Shipping Climate Policy International Maritime Law

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